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May 21, 2026

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(Securities code: 8291 TSE Standard Market)
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Notice Concerning the Opinions of the Company's Board of Directors on the Shareholder Proposals

Nissan Tokyo Sales Holdings Co., Ltd. (the "Company") has received two letters of proposals from shareholders—one from NIPPON ACTIVE VALUE FUND PLC, a shareholder of the Company (the "Shareholder Proposal I"), and the other from Mercury AIFLNP V.C.I.C Ltd, another shareholder of the Company (the "Shareholder Proposal II"), for agenda items for the 114th Annual General Meeting of Shareholders scheduled for June 25, 2026.

At the meeting of the Board of Directors held today, the Company resolved to oppose all of the shareholder proposals. Details are as follows.

Shareholder Proposal I

1. Proposing Shareholder
   NIPPON ACTIVE VALUE FUND PLC

2. Agenda Items
   (1) Share Repurchase
   (2) Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation Concerning the Number of Outside Directors
   (3) Approval of the Amount of Remuneration Related to a Restricted Share-Based Remuneration Plan
   (4) Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation Concerning the Record Date for the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders

3. Proposal Details and Rationale
   As described in the Attachment "Details of Shareholder Proposal I."

4. Opinion of the Board of Directors of the Company Regarding the Shareholder Proposal I
   (1) Share Repurchase
   1. Opinion of the Board of Directors of the Company
      The Board of Directors of the Company is against this Shareholder Proposal.

   2. Reasons for Opposition
      The Company believes that, in seeking to enhance corporate value, it is important to comprehensively determine shareholder return policies while taking into consideration the balance with investments necessary for sustainable growth. Requiring the Company to repurchase shares at a certain scale, as proposed in this agenda item, may impair the flexibility of capital allocation based on business strategy, investment plans, and financial strategy, and therefore the Company believes that such proposal would not contribute to the enhancement of the Company's medium- to long-term corporate value.

      As announced in February 2026, the Company introduced a dividend policy targeting a dividend on equity ratio ("DOE") of 3% or higher in order to enhance shareholder returns and provide more stable dividends.

      In addition, with respect to the medium-term approach to dividends, the Company continues to consider further enhancement of shareholder returns. The Company also continues to consider future capital policies, including the dividend policy, in a manner consistent with management strategies under the Medium-term Management Plan, which is to start in the next fiscal year.

For the reasons stated above, the Board of Directors of the Company opposes this proposal.

(2) Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation Concerning the Number of Outside Directors

1. Opinion of the Board of Directors of the Company

The Board of Directors of the Company is <u>against</u> this Shareholder Proposal.

2. Reasons for Opposition

The Company recognises that it is important to ensure the independence of the Board of Directors and strengthen its supervisory functions. However, the Company believes that, in order to improve the effectiveness of governance, it is important to consider in a multifaceted and comprehensive manner the appropriate composition of the Board of Directors required for the Company, including not only the number and ratio of independent outside directors, but also their qualities, appropriate skill sets, and diversity. The Company believes that the current Board structure already provides sufficient supervisory functions.

On the other hand, uniformly stipulating a majority requirement in the Articles of Incorporation, as proposed in this shareholder proposal, may unduly restrict the ability to review and optimise the composition of the Board of Directors flexibly in response to future changes in the business environment and shifts in management strategy, and is therefore considered inappropriate.

Prior to the resolution of the Board's opinion on this proposal, the contents of this shareholder proposal were also deliberated by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, where independent outside directors form a majority of the members. After discussion based on the recommendations of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, the Board of Directors reached the above conclusion.

For the reasons stated above, the Board of Directors of the Company opposes this proposal.

(3) Approval of the Amount of Remuneration Related to a Restricted Share-Based Remuneration Plan

1. Opinion of the Board of Directors of the Company

The Board of Directors of the Company is <u>against</u> this Shareholder Proposal.

2. Reasons for Opposition

The Company has already introduced performance- and results-linked remuneration, including share price-linked remuneration, for directors concurrently serving as executive officers, thereby establishing an incentive structure designed to promote value sharing with shareholders. In addition, the Company has introduced an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) for employees in order to foster common incentives throughout the organization.

In this regard, introducing an additional share-based remuneration plan under a separate framework, as proposed in this agenda item, may lack consistency with the overall design of the Company's remuneration system, and the Company believes that the necessity for such a system is currently limited. Accordingly, the Company considers the proposal inappropriate.

On the other hand, the Company will continue to comprehensively consider the optimal structure of incentive remuneration systems that promote value sharing with shareholders.

Prior to the resolution of the Board's opinion on this proposal, the contents of this shareholder proposal were also deliberated by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, where independent outside directors form a majority of the members. After discussion based on the recommendations of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee, the Board of Directors reached the above conclusion.

For the reasons stated above, the Board of Directors of the Company opposes this proposal.

(4) Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation Concerning the Record Date for the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders

1. Opinion of the Board of Directors of the Company

The Board of Directors of the Company is <u>against</u> this Shareholder Proposal.

2. Reasons for Opposition

The Company recognises that reviewing the manner of information disclosure, including the enhancement of management-related information, is an important management issue. As part of such efforts, the Company also recognises the significance of early disclosure of its annual securities report and has been endeavouring to accelerate disclosure to the extent practicable in light of current operational practices.

On the other hand, the Company has also received opinions from other shareholders requesting enhanced disclosure in notices of convocation of general meetings of shareholders and other materials necessary for the exercise of voting rights, reflecting a variety of expectations regarding the disclosure of information necessary for voting decisions. In addition, postponing the timing of the general meeting of shareholders would have a significant impact on the overall operational schedule, and the Company recognises that there are considerable practical burdens and challenges associated with implementing such a change at this time. Taking into account such shareholder opinions and practical considerations, the Company believes it is appropriate to prioritise and consider responses within a practically feasible scope.

Furthermore, the draft revisions to the Corporate Governance Code announced on April 10, 2026 also referred to the need for institutional arrangements in this area. Accordingly, the Company believes that this matter should be considered carefully while closely monitoring developments in the practical environment and institutional framework. Therefore, the Company has concluded that stipulating a change to the record date in the Articles of Incorporation at this time would be inappropriate.

For the reasons stated above, the Board of Directors of the Company opposes this proposal.

Shareholder Proposal II

1. Proposing Shareholder
   Mercury AIFLNP V.C.I.C Ltd

2. Agenda Items
   (1) Appropriation of Surplus
   (2) Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to Require Special Confirmation of Shareholder Intent Before the Activation of Takeover Defence Measures
   (3) Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to Eliminate Improper Transaction Risks Associated with Policy Shareholdings

3. Proposal Details and Rationale
   As described in the Attachment "Details of Shareholder Proposal II."

4. Opinion of the Company's Board of Directors on Shareholder Proposal II
   (1) Appropriation of Surplus

1. Opinion of the Board of Directors of the Company

The Board of Directors of the Company is <u>against</u> this Shareholder Proposal.

2. Reasons for Opposition

The Company recognises shareholder returns as one of its highest management priorities. In February 2026, the Company introduced a dividend policy targeting a DOE of 3% or higher in order to enhance shareholder returns and provide more stable dividends.

At the General Meeting of Shareholders scheduled for June 25, 2026, the Company plans to submit a proposal for the appropriation of surplus providing for a year-end dividend of ¥15 per share. If approved, the annual dividend will amount to ¥27 per share. This corresponds to a dividend payout ratio of more than 59%, significantly exceeding the target payout ratio of 30% or higher set forth in the Medium-term Management Plan ending in fiscal year 2026.

Requiring a DOE-based dividend of 12% at a fixed level, as proposed in this agenda item, may lack consistency with the Company's investment strategy for sustainable growth and its financial soundness. The Company continues to consider future capital policies, including the dividend policy, in a manner consistent with management strategies under the Medium-term Management Plan, which is to start in the next fiscal year.

For the reasons stated above, the Board of Directors of the Company opposes this proposal.

(2) Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to Require Special Confirmation of Shareholder Intent Before the Activation of Takeover Defence Measures

1. Opinion of the Board of Directors of the Company

The Board of Directors of the Company is <u>against</u> this Shareholder Proposal.

2. Reasons for Opposition

The Company plans to submit a proposal to renew its policy for responding to acquisitions (the "Policy") to the General Meeting of Shareholders scheduled for June 25, 2026, thereby providing shareholders with an opportunity to make a determination on the matter. In addition, under the Policy, it is generally contemplated that, prior to the implementation of countermeasures, shareholders will be given an opportunity under certain conditions to express their intentions at a meeting convened for the purpose of confirming shareholder intent. The purpose of the Policy is to secure the information and consideration period necessary for shareholders to appropriately determine whether to accept or reject acquisition proposals.

This proposal requires the approval of at least 90% of the shareholders present if the average PBR for a certain period is below 1.0x. However, if a specific shareholder or shareholder group were to hold more than 10% of the Company's shares, such shareholder or group would effectively obtain veto rights over the countermeasures set forth in the Policy. As a result, this could make it difficult to secure the information and consideration opportunities needed by other minority shareholders, thereby undermining the purpose of the Policy and potentially harming the common interests of shareholders.

For the reasons stated above, the Board of Directors of the Company opposes this proposal.

(3) Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to Eliminate Improper Transaction Risks Associated with Policy Shareholdings

1. Opinion of the Board of Directors of the Company

The Board of Directors of the Company is <u>against</u> this Shareholder Proposal.

2. Reasons for Opposition

The Company annually reviews the rationale for its shareholdings at meetings of the Board of Directors from both quantitative perspectives, including capital costs, and qualitative perspectives, including business relationships, and conducts sales as necessary. The Company believes that this policy is functioning effectively.

The appropriateness of holding policy-shareholdings should be left to individual management judgment, and the Company believes that stipulating in the Articles of Incorporation a blanket prohibition on holding such shares would be inappropriate.

In addition, the Company believes that including such specific matters relating to business execution in the Articles of Incorporation, which establish the Company's fundamental rules, would be inappropriate.

For the reasons stated above, the Board of Directors of the Company opposes this proposal.

Appendix 1: “Details of Shareholder Proposal I”

Of the written shareholder proposal submitted by the proposing shareholder, the “Summary of the Proposal” is reproduced verbatim, while the “Reasons for the Proposal” are summaries prepared by the proposing shareholder at the request of the Company and are reproduced as submitted.

Part 1: Proposed Agenda Items

1. Share Repurchase
2. Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation Concerning the Number of Outside Directors
3. Revision of Remuneration Amount Related to a Restricted Share-Based Remuneration Plan
4. Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation Concerning the Record Date for the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders

Part 2: Summary and Reasons for the Proposals

1. Share Repurchase

(1) Summary of the Proposal

Pursuant to Article 156, Paragraph 1 of the Companies Act, the Company shall repurchase shares of its common stock, within one year from the conclusion of this Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, up to a total of 5,957,000 shares and an aggregate acquisition price of ¥3,157,000,000, through the delivery of cash consideration.

(2) Reasons for the Proposal

The Company’s share price has remained sluggish since last year, which may indicate that the market considers the Company’s measures to date to be insufficient. Accordingly, in order to further enhance shareholder returns and improve capital efficiency, we believe that the Company should adopt measures to repurchase approximately 10% of its total issued shares and cancel such shares pursuant to Article 178 of the Companies Act.

2. Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation Concerning the Number of Outside Directors

(1) Summary of the Proposal

In order for outside directors to constitute a majority of the Company’s directors, Article 18 of the Articles of Incorporation shall be amended as follows. Provided, however, that if the approval of any other proposal at the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders (including proposals submitted by the Company) requires formal adjustments to the provisions set forth in this proposal (including, but not limited to, revisions to article numbering), the relevant provisions pertaining to this proposal shall be deemed replaced by the provisions after such necessary adjustments have been made.

Current Provision	Proposed Amendment
(Number of Directors) Article 18. The Company shall have not more than 18 directors. <u>2. (Newly established)</u>	(Number of Directors) Article 18. The Company shall have not more than 18 directors. <u>2. A majority of the directors of the Company shall be outside directors as provided for in Article 2, Paragraph 1, Item 15 of the Companies Act.</u>

(2) Reasons for the Proposal

At the meeting of the Board of Directors held on February 13, 2026, the Company unanimously resolved to introduce the “Policy for Responding to Large-Scale Purchases of the Company’s Shares (Takeover Response Policy)” (the “Anti-Takeover Measures”) and announced that the renewal of such Anti-Takeover Measures would be submitted as a proposal at this Annual General Meeting of Shareholders.

The principles of free trading of shares and shareholder equality form the foundation of the capital markets. Anti-takeover measures are highly exceptional measures that may significantly affect the exercise of shareholder rights and the functioning of the stock market. Accordingly, when introducing such measures, it is essential that the Board of Directors exercise sufficient deliberation and oversight from an independent standpoint and make reasonable and highly transparent decisions from the perspective of the common interests of shareholders.

There is significant doubt as to whether the Company’s Board of Directors has, in fact, conducted sufficient

deliberation from a truly independent standpoint and made decisions that contribute to the common interests of shareholders with respect to the continuation of the Anti-Takeover Measures.
This case also demonstrates the importance of appointing outside directors possessing appropriate qualifications and capabilities so that they form a majority of the Board of Directors.

3. Revision of Remuneration Amount Related to a Restricted Share-Based Remuneration Plan

(1) Summary of the Proposal

The limit on remuneration for the Company's directors was approved at the General Meeting of Shareholders held on June 22, 2005 as an annual amount not exceeding ¥300 million. The proposal seeks to grant, separately from the above remuneration limit, monetary remuneration claims for the granting of restricted share in an amount not exceeding ¥100 million per year and with an upper limit of 180,000 shares to be granted.
The specific timing of payment, allocation, and other conditions shall be determined by the Board of Directors; however, the system shall be designed as a performance-linked incentive program. Such performance indicators may include KPIs such as ROE and TSR (Total Shareholder Return), although the selection of specific indicators shall be appropriately determined by the Board of Directors in light of the Company's management strategy and business environment. In addition, the system shall be designed so that, if the applicable performance criteria are achieved, restricted share equivalent in aggregate to three times the amount of fixed remuneration shall be granted over the next three years.

(2) Reasons for the Proposal

The proposing shareholder believes that the greatest weakness of Japanese boards of directors is the limited share ownership of individual directors and the resulting lack of a shareholder-oriented perspective. At the Company as well, directors hold only limited amounts of Company shares, and the majority of directors' economic benefits consist of fixed base remuneration. Although there is some remuneration linked to the achievement of certain performance targets, the proposing shareholder believes that value sharing with shareholders, which is the purpose of share-based remuneration, remains insufficient. It is necessary to provide directors with economic incentives to achieve the sustainable enhancement of the Company's corporate value and to align their interests with those of shareholders so that they may share with shareholders the benefits resulting from improvements in corporate value.
An effective benchmark for share-based remuneration designed to promote value sharing between directors and shareholders is considered to be an amount equivalent to three times fixed remuneration. Since share-based remuneration has little meaning unless granted during directors' tenure, it is necessary that grants of a certain scale be made within a relatively short period of time.

4. Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation Concerning the Record Date for the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders

(1) Summary of the Proposal

Articles 12 and 13 of the Company's Articles of Incorporation shall be amended as follows. Provided, however, that if the approval of any other proposal at the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders (including proposals submitted by the Company) requires formal adjustments to the provisions set forth in this proposal (including, but not limited to, revisions to article numbering), the relevant provisions pertaining to this proposal shall be deemed replaced by the provisions after such necessary adjustments have been made.

(Underlined portions indicate amendments.)

Current Provision	Proposed Amendment
(Convocation) Article 12. The Annual General Meeting of Shareholders shall be convened in June of each year, and extraordinary general meetings of shareholders shall be convened as necessary by the President and Representative Director based on resolution of the Board of Directors. In the event of an accident or inability of the President and Representative Director, another director	(Convocation) Article 12. <u>Deleted.</u>

Current Provision	Proposed Amendment
shall act in accordance with the order predetermined by the Board of Directors.	
(Record Date for Annual General Meeting of Shareholders)	(Record Date for Annual General Meeting of Shareholders)
Article 13. The record date for exercising voting rights at the Company's Annual General Meeting of Shareholders shall be <u>March 31</u> of each year.	Article 13. The record date for exercising voting rights at the Company's Annual General Meeting of Shareholders shall be <u>May 15</u> of each year.
<u>2. (Newly established)</u>	<u>2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Company may, when necessary, set a record date by resolution of the Board of Directors upon prior public notice.</u>

(2) Reasons for the Proposal

Currently, the record date for voting rights at the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders is set as March 31, and pursuant to the Companies Act, the meeting is held by the end of June. On the other hand, the annual securities report, which contains important information for shareholders in making voting decisions, is in practice disclosed only after the meeting or at a time extremely close to the meeting date, such as the day before the meeting. As a result, it is effectively difficult for investors to sufficiently analyse the contents and reflect them in their voting decisions, and in reality, no meaningful review period is secured.

By changing the record date for voting rights to mid-May, it would become possible to postpone the date of the General Meeting of Shareholders from the end of June to as late as mid-August, thereby enabling the Company to establish a schedule under which the annual securities report and related information can be disclosed sufficiently in advance of the meeting.

Appendix 2: "Details of Shareholder Proposal II"
The relevant portions of the written shareholder proposal submitted by the proposing shareholder are reproduced verbatim.

I. Proposed Agenda Items

1. Appropriation of Surplus
2. Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to Require Special Confirmation of Shareholder Intent Before the Activation of Takeover Defence Measures
3. Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to Eliminate Improper Transaction Risks Associated with Policy Shareholdings

II. Details and Reasons for the Proposals

1. Appropriation of Surplus

[Details of the Proposal]

(1) Type of dividend property
Cash

(2) Matters concerning the allocation of dividend property and the total amount thereof
The Company shall pay a dividend in an amount equal to ¥105 per common share, less the amount of dividend per share proposed by the Company's Board of Directors in the proposal for the appropriation of surplus approved at the 114th AGM of the Company (the "Company's Profit Appropriation Proposal").

If the amount obtained by deducting ¥12 from 12/100 of the net assets per share for the fiscal year ended March 2026, rounded down to the nearest yen, differs from ¥105, the reference to ¥105 above shall be read as the amount obtained by deducting ¥12 from 12/100 of the net assets per share for the fiscal year ended March 2026, rounded down to the nearest yen.

The total amount of dividends shall be calculated by multiplying the applicable dividend per share by the number of shares eligible for dividends as of the record date for voting rights at the Company's 114th AGM.

(3) Effective date of the dividend of surplus
The day following the date of the Company's 114th AGM.

This proposal is submitted as an additional proposal that is independent of, and compatible with, the Company's Profit Appropriation Proposal, if such proposal is submitted at the 114th AGM.

[Reasons for the Proposal]

This proposal is intended to provide a dividend equivalent to 12/100 of net assets per share, namely a DOE (dividend on equity ratio) of 12%. DOE is a shareholder return metric calculated by dividing the annual dividend per share by net assets per share. The proposing shareholder estimates the Company's cost of equity to be approximately 12%. Since the Company paid an interim dividend of ¥12 per share on 2 December 2025, this proposal deducts ¥12 from the amount calculated on the basis of a 12% DOE.

The Company's share price has remained depressed at a level far below 1x PBR. This is the result of the Board's continued failure to achieve ROE above the Company's cost of equity, while leaving the serious impairment of shareholders' value unaddressed. In light of this situation, the proposal seeks to secure a minimum return for shareholders through shareholder distributions and to require the Company to improve earnings performance and capital efficiency, thereby restoring shareholders' value to a level consistent with a PBR of at least 1x.

2. Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to Require Special Confirmation of Shareholder Intent Before the Activation of Takeover Defence Measures

[Details of the Proposal]

The following chapter and article shall be newly added to the current Articles of Incorporation.

Chapter 8 Takeover Defence Measures

Article 43 Activation of a Policy for Responding to Acquisitions

Where the Company has adopted, by resolution of the Board of Directors or the AGM, a policy for responding to large-scale acquisitions of the Company's shares, meaning a purchase, tender offer, or other acquisition of the Company's shares that would result in the acquirer's shareholding ratio reaching 20% or more, and where each of the following items applies, the Company shall obtain approval at a shareholders' meeting in order to confirm the special intent of shareholders before implementing a gratis allotment of share acquisition rights under such policy (the "Countermeasure").

1. The Company intends to implement the Countermeasure.
2. The Company's price-to-book ratio (PBR), calculated based on the average closing price of the Company's shares on each trading day on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc. over the most recent 20 trading days up to and including the business day immediately preceding the date on which the Company receives a recommendation from the independent committee regarding the implementation of the Countermeasure, is below 1x.

(2) Notwithstanding Paragraph 1 of Article 16 of these Articles of Incorporation, the approval set forth in the preceding paragraph shall require the affirmative vote of at least 90% of the voting rights of shareholders present who are entitled to exercise their voting rights.

[Reasons for the Proposal]

On 13 February 2026, the Company introduced and immediately put into effect a takeover defence plan solely by resolution of the Board of Directors, without obtaining prior approval at a shareholders' meeting. A decision of such importance should not be made by management alone, with shareholders subsequently forced into a position of mere ex post ratification. This approach can only be described as disregard for shareholders. Accordingly, with respect to the takeover defence plan already introduced by the Company, the proposing shareholder proposes that a high level of shareholder approval be required before any Countermeasure may be activated.

The proposing shareholder is firmly opposed to takeover defence measures. In principle, the activation of any takeover defence measure is unacceptable, regardless of whether the Company's PBR is above or below 1x. However, activating such a measure while the Company's PBR remains below 1x is wholly indefensible. The Company's management should not seek to justify its control while leaving unaddressed the capital market's low assessment of the Company, as evidenced by a PBR below 1x. Management must first improve the market's assessment of the Company by enhancing shareholders' value.

For the avoidance of doubt, this proposal is not intended to permit the Company to implement any Countermeasure without shareholder approval merely because its PBR is 1x or higher.

3. Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to Eliminate Improper Transaction Risks Associated with Policy Shareholdings

[Details of the Proposal]

The following chapter and article shall be newly added to the current Articles of Incorporation.

Chapter 9 Elimination of Improper Transaction Risks

Article 44 Prohibition on Holding Policy Shareholdings

In order to ensure legal compliance and establish fair business practices, the Company shall not hold shares held for the purpose of strengthening or maintaining relationships with business partners or business cooperation relationships (the "Policy Shareholdings"). If the Company holds any Policy Shareholdings at the beginning of a fiscal year, the Company shall sell all such shares during that fiscal year.

If the proposing shareholder's proposal titled "Partial Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to Require Special

Confirmation of Shareholder Intent Before the Activation of Takeover Defence Measures" is not approved, Chapter 9 shall be read as Chapter 8, and Article 44 shall be read as Article 43.

[Reasons for the Proposal]

The Company holds Policy Shareholdings for the stated purpose of maintaining relationships with business partners and strengthening business cooperation. However, relationships maintained or strengthened through the ownership of a business partner's shares cannot be regarded as sound from the perspective of fair business practices. Financial regulators have also pointed out that policy shareholdings may become a breeding ground for improper conduct. From the perspective of the cost of capital, it is also clear that maintaining Policy Shareholdings lacks economic rationality.

In light of these circumstances, it is necessary, from the standpoint of legal compliance and the establishment of fair business practices, to prohibit the holding of Policy Shareholdings and to require the sale of existing Policy Shareholdings.

For further details of the shareholder proposals, please refer to the website URL or QR code below.

Website URL
Shift Nissan Tokyo (8291 JP Equity)
https://shiftnissantokyo.com/english

QR Code